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THE USMCA & UNITED STATES-CANADA 
TRADE RELATIONS: 
THE PERSPECTIVE OF A U.S. TRADE 
PRACTITIONER 
Terence P. Stewart† & Shahrzad Noorbaloochi†† 
ABSTRACT: This article is taken from a presentation given by Terence P. Stewart at the 
Canada-United States Law Institute 42nd Annual Conference, April 12, 2018.1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On September 30, 2018, the United States, Mexico, and Canada concluded 
negotiations on a new trade agreement to replace the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”).2 The new agreement, titled the United-States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement (“USMCA” or “Agreement”), was announced after a thirteen-
month-long negotiation period between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. 
 
 †  Managing Partner, Law Offices of Stewart & Stewart, Washington, D.C.. 
 ††  Associate, Law Offices of Stewart & Stewart, Washington, D.C.. We thank Courtney G. 
Taylor, a graduate of American University Washington College of Law and the University of 
Ottawa Faculty of Law for her extensive assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1 This paper was prepared for a talk on April 12, 2018, when tariffs pursuant to Section 232 
of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 were in effect with respect to Canada and Mexico.  Section 
III.B, supra pp. 11-13, should be read with this in mind.  Since that time, Section 232 tariffs 
have been lifted.   
 2 North American Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605, Ch. 11 (1993) 
[hereinafter “NAFTA”]. 
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The Trump Administration identified revisions to NAFTA or withdrawal from 
the trilateral agreement as a top trade priority upon taking office. The President 
characterized NAFTA as one of the worst trade deals ever negotiated by the U.S., 
and many in organized labor and related NGOs had longstanding concerns about 
the effectiveness of NAFTA in improving standards of living for working class 
families and the loss of good paying jobs in America. 3 Much of the U.S. business 
community has been highly supportive of NAFTA, though many were equally 
supportive of updating NAFTA to reflect issues of importance to the business 
community in 2017-2018. The President’s focus is largely premised on the large 
trade deficits the U.S. runs with Mexico and Canada, though much of the deficit 
with Canada over time has been energy related. In 2017, the U.S. trade deficit with 
Mexico was $70.95 billion, and the trade deficit with Canada was $17.05 billion.4 
Statistically, thousands of factories have closed in the U.S. since 1994 when 
NAFTA came into force, and large numbers of factories and jobs were transferred 
to Mexico, before larger movements to Asia.5 As stated by U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Lighthizer, NAFTA had “failed many, many Americans 
and need[ed] major improvements.”6 
In setting out the goals of a new deal, Ambassador Lighthizer stated, “we need 
to ensure that the huge trade deficits do not continue and we have balance and 
reciprocity.”7 To advance reciprocity, he noted the need to reconfigure the rules of 
origin for autos to “require higher NAFTA content and substantial U.S. content.”8 
With these U.S. aims in mind, the USTR engaged its neighbors to pursue an 
updated and potentially rebalanced arrangement. The Trump Administration 
envisioned a speedy process for the renegotiations. 
While broad-based trade negotiations would normally take years to go through 
the wide variety of issues, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico had all been signatories 
to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (“TPP”) Agreement which contained text on many 
topics of likely interest to an updated NAFTA. While the U.S. withdrew from the 
TPP after President Trump assumed office, many of the chapters of the USMCA 
draw heavily from the previously negotiated TPP text, using it as the baseline for 
what had been deemed acceptable for all three parties in that agreement. The 
updated USMCA reflects the updating of NAFTA through the addition of topics 
both contained in the TPP and new agreements. Whereas NAFTA consists of 
twenty-two chapters and the TPP consists of thirty chapters, the USMCA has a 
 
 3 Marcy Kaptur, Nafta failed Americans workers. Here’s how Trump can fix our trade 
woes, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/
aug/24/nafta-failed-american-workers-congresswoman-marcy-kaptur. 
 4 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Canada, Trade Balance, 
available at https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada. 
 5 ROBERT E. SCOTT, ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, HEADING SOUTH: U.S.-MEXICO TRADE 
AND JOB DISPLACEMENT AFTER NAFTA (May 3, 2011), available at https://www.epi.org/ 
publication/heading_south_u-s-mexico_trade_and_job_displacement_after_nafta1/. 
 6 David Lawder, U.S. Trade Envoy Lighthizer Says NAFTA has “failed” Americans, 
REUTERS (Aug. 16, 2017, 10:28 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/trade-nafta-usa-
lighthizer-idUSW1N1D90LH. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
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total of thirty-four chapters.9 Several chapters are almost verbatim from the 
negotiated TPP text, such as those on Digital Trade (USMCA Chapter 19), Small- 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises (USMCA Chapter 25), Competitiveness (USMCA 
Chapter 26), Anticorruption (USMCA Chapter 27), and Good Regulatory 
Practices (USMCA Chapter 28).10 The Agreement’s only chapters without 
equivalents in the two prior texts were Chapter 12 Sectoral Annexes, largely 
devoted to defining standards and definitions of specific product groups within the 
individual USMCA countries, and Chapter 33 on Macroeconomic Policies and 
Exchange Rate Matters.11 Chapter 33 will be discussed in a later section but it is 
worth noting that the USMCA is the first free trade agreement (“FTA”) negotiated 
by the U.S. which includes provisions addressing currency manipulation and 
devaluation for competitive advantage, an issue of concern in recent years with 
certain countries, though not specifically with Canada or Mexico. 
Because the U.S. was seeking in part a rebalancing to address the deficits it 
was running with Canada and Mexico, the talks were always going to be difficult. 
As is true of most negotiations, the prospect of failure was present up to the very 
end. While negotiations were trilateral for most of the period, the U.S. and Mexico 
worked through issues between themselves and announced an agreement in 
August 2018.12 Whether Canada would be able to resolve outstanding issues with 
the U.S. in the timeframe permitted for a new trilateral deal made September 2018 
an interesting month with a deal reached between the three countries late on 
September 30th.13 Each country has its own process for considering the terms of 
the Agreement and whether the Agreement will be implemented into domestic law. 
In the U.S., the process of adopting implementing legislation has become 
challenging, although whether that will be true with the USMCA is yet to be seen. 
There will be groups in each country who have continuing concerns about the 
content of the USMCA. Most observers expect that the new Agreement, if 
implemented by each country, will go into effect in late 2019 or early 2020. 
As is true in any negotiation, no trading partner gets all that it is seeking in a 
final deal, and many proposals made may be made specifically to have something 
to “lose” in the negotiations or with the knowledge that the end game will look 
significantly different than the starting position. Thus, not surprisingly, none of 
the three parties achieved all that it staked out to achieve, but each achieved 
significant results. Certainly each government has declared satisfaction with the 
USMCA, and there are also obvious issues that each country has flagged as critical 
to the successful conclusion of negotiations that are reflected in the September 30, 
2018 Agreement. While Canada and Mexico are hoping to achieve a resolution of 
 
 9 For a complete overview of where the three texts converge and diverge, see Stewart and 
Stewart, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) of 2018, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Text, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Text Side-by-
Side (2018), available at http://www.stewartlaw.com/PracticeAreas/USMCASidebySide. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Jen Kirby, The US, Canada, and Mexico Have a New NAFTA Deal. It’s Called USMCA, 
VOX (Oct. 1, 2018, 9:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/1/17921966/usmca-nafta-
agreement-trump-canada. 
 13 Id. 
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current Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminum ahead of the signing of the 
Agreement on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires on November 30, 
press reports indicate that both countries will sign the Agreement even if the 232 
tariff issue has not been resolved by that point. 
The aim of this article is to briefly outline some of the key changes to NAFTA 
contained in the USMCA, assess their relevance for the United States and Canada, 
and explore whether these successful negotiations will provide likely forward 
movement in resolving a number of other bilateral and multilateral trade issues. 
II. SOME CHANGES FROM NAFTA CONTAINED IN THE USMCA 
Some of the major improvements in the USMCA as compared to NAFTA are 
the inclusion of chapters to address advancements in technology and other issues 
of increased importance to economic development.14 For example, the USMCA’s 
Chapter 19 is a new provision, not to be confused with Chapter 19 in NAFTA, to 
address the advent of digital trade.15 Under the new Chapter 19, parties are 
prohibited from imposing customs’ duties, fees, or other charges on or in 
connection with the importation or exportation of digital products transmitted 
electronically between a person of one party and a person of another party.16 
Chapter 19 also provides that parties cannot prohibit or restrict the cross-border 
transfer of information if such transfer is for business and prohibits parties from 
requiring that computing facilities be used or located in their territory as a 
condition for conducting business therein.17 These provisions are important for 
many businesses involved in e-commerce or digital trade. 
The USMCA also includes full chapters on labor, small- and medium-sized 
enterprise (“SME”) development, and currency manipulation.18 In the Labor 
Chapter (Chapter 23), the USMCA prohibits the importation of goods produced 
by forced labor, protects against labor discrimination on the basis of sex, sexual 
orientation, and gender identity, addresses violence against workers, and 
incorporates protections for migrant workers.19 These provisions are fully subject 
to the dispute settlement provisions of the USMCA.20 
Chapter 25 also constitutes a commitment to fostering the dynamism and 
competitiveness of SMEs.21 This chapter memorializes the parties’ commitment 
to cooperating to increase trade and investment opportunities for such 
 
 14 Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Exec. Office of the President, United-States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement Text ch. 19 (2018), available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/united-states-mexico [hereinafter 
USMCA]; see also Terence P. Stewart, The United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement 
(USMCA) - An Upgrade of the Trade Relationship Among North American Neighbors, Trade 
Flow (Oct. 11, 2018); http://www.stewartlaw.com/article/ViewArticle/1132. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. art. 19.3. 
 17 Id. arts. 19.11, 19.12. 
 18 Id. chs. 23, 25, 33. 
 19 Id. art. 23.12. 
 20 Id. art. 23.17(11). 
 21 Id. ch. 25. 
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enterprises.22 Accordingly, it asks that the parties establish an information-sharing 
mechanism, creates a “Committee on SME issues,” and mandates the convening 
of an annual SME Dialogue to facilitate the exchange of information among the 
parties.23 
A first for the United States is the Agreement’s inclusion of binding 
obligations among the parties as to currency manipulation and misalignment in 
Chapter 33.24 The USMCA is the first U.S. free trade agreement to include such a 
chapter. In this provision, each party “confirms” that it is bound under the IMF’s 
Articles of Agreement to avoid manipulating exchange rates and the international 
monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or 
to gain an unfair competitive advantage.25 Each party should, pursuant to this 
chapter, “(a) achieve and maintain a market-determined exchange rate regime; (b) 
refrain from competitive devaluation, including through intervention in the foreign 
exchange market; and (c) strengthen underlying economic fundamentals, which 
reinforces the conditions for macroeconomic and exchange rate stability.”26 This 
chapter also includes numerous transparency and reporting provisions,27 
establishes a “Macroeconomics Committee” to monitor implementation,28 and 
provides for dispute settlement procedures where a party has “failed to carry out 
an obligation.”29 The importance of this chapter is much more likely to be as a 
prototype for future U.S. FTAs rather than reflecting specific concerns from 
Canada or Mexico. 
Other issues addressed in the USMCA of importance to the U.S. were changes 
to the rules of origin for certain products, the opportunity to review the Agreement 
periodically with termination options, changes to investor-state dispute settlement, 
market access in dairy, and intellectual property issues on both biologics and 
copyright. Consider rules of origin. Because the U.S. Administration is concerned 
about the large trade deficits with Mexico and Canada, it pushed for changes to 
eligibility for duty-free treatment on motor vehicles since the entirety of the trade 
deficit with Mexico, and at least some of the deficit with Canada, flows from trade 
in autos and auto parts. Thus, the rules of origin provisions of Chapter 4 and its 
annexes30 raise the percentage of a motor vehicle’s content that must be built 
within North America from 62.5% to 75% (phased in over a period of years) in 
addition to other requirements to qualify for duty-free status.31 In addition, 70% of 
steel and aluminum used in the vehicles will also have to come from the three 
 
 22 Id. art. 25.2. 
 23 Id. art. 25.4. 
 24 Id. ch. 33. 
 25 Id. art. 33.4(1). 
 26 Id. art. 33.4(2). 
 27 Id. art. 33.5. 
 28 Id. art. 33.6. 
 29 Id. art. 33.8. 
 30 Id. ch. 4.  
 31 Id. Annex 4-B, art. 4-B.3(1). 
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nations.32 Finally, at least 30% of a vehicle’s content must be built in facilities 
where workers earn at least $16 per hour, increasing to 40-45% in 2023.33 
The U.S. Administration is obviously hopeful that these changed requirements 
for duty-free treatment will result in increased North American value added and, 
from Washington’s perspective, increased U.S. content. Mexico’s incoming 
government, though Jesús Seade (who shadowed the current Mexican trade 
negotiators during the final phases of the USMCA negotiations and is Mexico’s 
undersecretary of foreign relations for North America) has indicated that they 
believe the new rules of origin will actually benefit Mexico as additional 
production will (in his view) be done mainly in Mexico. Some in industry have 
opined that the new rules and their complexity may result in either no change as 
companies simply incur the ordinary customs duties or will result in reduced 
demand and a resulting reduced investment. Nonetheless, obtaining a change in 
the rules of origin for autos was an important objective for the Trump 
Administration that it has achieved. 
The United States also achieved somewhat greater market access in Canada 
for the U.S. dairy industry. Despite their supply-management system, Canada has 
increased its access for American dairy products by raising quotas on several 
products.34 Additionally, Canada will eliminate its Class 7 pricing systems, which 
will eliminate a significant irritant to American dairy producers of milk protein 
and formula.35 Both provisions, while rolled out progressively through annual 
increases in quotas and decreases in tariff rates, will allow Midwestern dairy 
producers in the United States to have greater American access to the Canadian 
market. There were other gains in agriculture for the U.S. including for wheat, 
eggs, poultry and turkeys. Canada also obtained increased access in the U.S. for 
dairy, peanuts, and sugar. 
The United States also secured higher tariff-free access for goods under the de 
minimis provisions in Chapter 7.36 The Customs Administration and Trade 
Facilitation Chapter allows American shipments to Canada under $150 CAD to be 
exempt from customs’ duties.37 In addition, shipments under $40 CAD are exempt 
from Canadian taxes.38 This represents a significant jump from the current 
thresholds of $20 CAD.39 The higher de minimis thresholds will ensure that small- 
and medium-sized enterprises will face lower costs in reaching Canadian 
consumers, will expand market access for growing firms, and facilitate e-
commerce direct to consumer sales.40 
 
 32 Id. Annex 4-B, art. 4-B.6(1). 
 33 Id. Annex 4-B, art. 4-B.7(1). 
 34 Id. Annex 2-B Appendix C. 
 35 Id. Annex 3-B Section C. 
 36 Id. ch. 7. 
 37 Id. art 7.8(1)(f)(iii). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Postal Imports Remission Order, SI/85-181 art. 4 (Oct. 16, 1985); Courier Imports 
Remission Order, SI/85-182 art. 4 (Oct. 16, 1985). 
 40 See Zak Stambor, NAFTA is now USMCA: Here’s what the deal means for e-retailers, 
DIGITAL COMM. 360 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.digitalcommerce360.com/2018/10/01/nafta-is-
now-usmca-heres-what-the-deal-means-for-e-retailers/. 
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The United States similarly was able to obtain a longer term of intellectual 
property protection in Chapter 20.41 Under Chapter 20, the period of copyright 
protection applicable to work, performance, or phonogram was increased to 
seventy years after the author’s death, from Canada’s current provision of fifty 
years of protection.42 Chapter 20 likewise increased the period of data protection 
for biologic drugs from Canada’s current term of eight years to ten years.43 This 
was an improvement over the TPP term which required eight years or more. The 
TPP outcome on biologics had drawn opposition from industry and from 
Congressional supporters.44 Specifically, in September 2017, Senator Orin Hatch 
expressed that the duration of data exclusivity for biologics should be at least 
twelve years (the current U.S. period of protection) and suggested that a term less 
than that would likely not meet the approval of Congress.45 The USMCA results 
are generally supported by producers but have raised concerns from unions and 
health care groups because of the potential to increase the costs of medicines.46 
The United States was additionally able to successfully remove the investor-
state dispute resolution mechanism (also referred to as ISDS) for any investments 
with Canada after a transition period for preexisting investments. This protection, 
previously granted under NAFTA Chapter 11, allowed investors in all three 
NAFTA countries to take their disputes to neutral arbitration in the event of any 
violation of the investment protections in the agreement.47 Critics of ISDS, 
including those in the Administration, stated that it violated national sovereignty, 
especially hindering legislative efforts on labor and the environment.48 Some 
Canadian experts have also raised concerns with ISDS, “caution[ing] against [its] 
rising costs . . . , both financial and to the fabric of [Canadian] democracies.”49 
According to such reports, Canada has paid more than $219 million in damages 
and settlements and $95 million in unrecoverable legal costs under the ISDS 
system.50 
Moving forward, this system is completely removed with respect to Canada, 
with only a phasing-out provision to allow for another three years of disputes under 
 
 41 USMCA, supra note 14 ch. 20. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Brett Forman, Stakeholders: TPP-like IP Chapter in NAFTA Wouldn’t Win 
Congressional Support, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (May 8, 2018, 9:12 AM), 
https://insidetrade.com/daily-news/stakeholders-tpp-ip-chapter-nafta-wouldnt-win-
congressional-support. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Patient groups: Pharmaceutical provisions in USMCA inconsistent with U.S. law, INSIDE 
U.S. TRADE (Nov. 5, 2018), https://insidetrade.com/trade/patient-groups-pharmaceutical-
provisions-usmca-inconsistent-us-law?s=em. 
 47 NAFTA, supra note 2 ch. 11. 
 48 See U.S. Trade Policy Agenda, Hearing Before H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 115th 
Cong. 27-28 (2017) (statement of Amb. Robert Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Rep.) (“I am troubled by 
the sovereignty issue. I am troubled by the fact that anyone, anyone can overrule the United 
States Congress and the President of the United States when it has passed a law. That is troubling 
to me.”). 
 49 Scott Sinclair, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Canada’s Track Record Under 
NAFTA Chapter 11: North American Investor-State Disputes to January 2018 at 1 (Jan. 2018). 
 50 Id. 
 The USMCA & US-Canada Trade Relations 287 
the NAFTA clause.51 Investors will now be able to seek redress in either the U.S. 
or Canadian courts with certain modifications to their substantive legal rights. 
ISDS has been a matter of concern to workers and NGOs for many years and 
an issue supporting opposition by those groups to earlier trade agreements. For 
businesses, there is obvious concern about the perceived reduction in protections 
for investments, although those fears may be less for our neighbors than may exist 
with other countries if the USMCA approach is the “new” model. From the 
Administration’s perspective, the modification in investor-state dispute and the 
chapters on labor and environment were major efforts to broaden the base of 
support for the new agreement. Time will tell whether the changes are sufficient 
to develop a significantly more bipartisan adoption of any implementing 
legislation. 
Finally, the United States pushed for a provision contained in Chapter 32 
(32.10) that reflects the concern of the United States that the economic system of 
countries like China, with heavily state-directed economies, creates massive 
distortions both within their economies and in global trade flows.52 Specifically, 
the provision in Article 32.10 requires any USMCA country that might engage in 
trade negotiations with a country treated as a non-market economy (“NME”) under 
trade remedy laws to notify the other countries of such negotiations, keep them 
informed, provide them the opportunity to review any agreement, and determine 
whether the USMCA will remain in place with respect to that country.53 While 
both Canada and Mexico have indicated the clause will not prevent them from 
negotiating with China, the provision is a signal of the United States’ ongoing 
concern with non-market economies and the distortions it creates for the U.S. and 
businesses. 
Moreover, while many articles view the provision as a “poison” pill that is an 
effort to move countries into a U.S. or China camp, there is a more straight forward 
interpretation of the provision as one reflecting the Administration’s concern that 
current WTO rules do not effectively deal with the distortions created by China’s 
state-directed economy. Hence, the opportunity to be informed of such a potential 
FTA and to understand the terms of that agreement, permits other parties to the 
USMCA to decide if the agreement with the country doing the FTA will distort 
the economic outcome in light of the new arrangement with a non-market economy 
country. The notice requirement and the continuation of a bilateral agreement 
among the remaining members are consistent with the general withdrawal 
provisions contained in Article 34.6. 
There were obviously many negotiation issues of importance to Canada as 
well. Such issues include maintaining a cultural exemption, protecting indigenous 
rights, minimizing market access in dairy, and maintaining Chapter 19 dispute 
settlement for antidumping and countervailing duty cases, to name just four. As 
noted above, while the U.S. achieved some limited improved market access in 
dairy, the Canadian system is maintained and the market access is quite limited 
considering the FTA. Similarly, Canada has maintained its cultural exemption, 
 
 51 USMCA, supra note 14 ch. 14, Annex 14-C. 
 52 USMCA, supra note 14 art. 32.10. 
 53 Id. 
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which Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated was “fundamental to 
Canadians.”54 Additionally, Article 32.5, included at the behest of Canada, retains 
protections for indigenous peoples, providing that nothing in the USMCA “shall 
preclude a Party from adopting or maintaining a measure it deems necessary to 
fulfill its obligations to indigenous peoples” so long as such measures are not 
“arbitrary or unjustified discrimination against persons of the other 
Parties . . . or . . . disguised restriction on trade in goods, services, and 
investment.”55 
Furthermore, NAFTA’s Chapter 19 has been maintained, now as part of 
Chapter 10 of the USMCA.56 Specifically, the old Chapter 19 has been continued 
without change and provides for a binational panel to review antidumping and 
countervailing duty determinations in lieu of judicial review in the country 
conducting the investigations or reviews.57 Despite the fact that Chapter 19 panels 
have proven to be no quicker in general than judicial reviews in U.S. courts, 
Canada was adamant about maintaining this approach to review of agency 
determinations. Canadian commentators have also recognized other limitations of 
Chapter 19, noting that its “binational review panels did not achieve Canada’s 
sought-after exemption from the application of domestic trade remedy laws,” or 
resolution “of major trade disputes such as softwood lumber.”58 Nevertheless, 
while the U.S. Administration had sought elimination of the binational panel 
approach as an important objective for the U.S. in a revised agreement, Chapter 
10 of the USMCA contains identical language to the NAFTA Chapter 19. 
Another important issue for Canada was that of an exemption from potential 
future U.S. Section 232 measures on its auto sector.59 In a side letter to the 
USMCA, the United States agreed to provide an exemption of at least sixty days 
of any additional tariffs to Canada in the event of future Section 232 measures.60 
Additionally, under the side letter, Canada is guaranteed an exemption from 
Section 232 tariffs for exports to the United States of 2.6 million Canadian 
automobiles, all light trucks, and $32.4 billion worth of Canadian auto parts.61 
Canada asserts that the side letter does not diminish Canada’s right to challenge 
Section 232 measures at the WTO and to undertake retaliatory measures of 
 
 54 Mahem Abedi, Trudeau Says no NAFTA Without Cultural Exemption – Is It Really that 
Important? GLOBAL NEWS (Sept. 5, 2018, 3:57 PM), available at https://globalnews.ca/news/
4428229/nafta-cultural-exemption-canada/. 
 55 USMCA, supra note 14 art. 32.5. 
 56 Id. ch. 10; see also Heather Long, USMCA: Who are the winners and losers of the ‘new 
NAFTA’?, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/01/
winners-losers-usmca-trade-deal/?utm_term=.b53d0e046a7e. 
 57 USMCA, supra note 14 ch. 10 § D. 
 58 Scott Sinclair, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, Saving NAFTA Chapter 19: Was 
it Worth it? at 19 (Oct. 2018). 
 59 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, USMCA Side Letters, 
available at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/FTA/USMCA/
US%20Mexico%20232%20Side%20Letter.pdf. 
 60 Id. at 2. 
 61 Id. 
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equivalent commercial effect, where warranted.62 In a separate side letter with 
Mexico, the United States provided similar guarantees, exempting from any 
potential future Section 232 tariffs 2.6 million passenger vehicles, all light trucks, 
and $108 billion worth of Mexican auto parts.63 
Additionally, the U.S. Administration originally outlined plans for a provision 
requiring automatic termination of the Agreement after five years64 as a way to 
ensure periodic reexamination of the Agreement and to assess whether it was 
achieving reciprocal benefits. Canada and Mexico were not supportive of such an 
approach. In the end, the countries agreed to a sixteen-year period before 
expiration, extendable through reviews every six years.65 Thus, Canada, Mexico, 
and the U.S. can address changes perceived to be needed periodically, and failure 
to agree gives countries a decade to resolve their differences before the Agreement 
terminates. 
Finally, the USMCA provides for further cooperation between the parties on 
various other issues of significance in the trade arena. The USMCA allows for 
cooperation between the United States and Canada on many issues facing North 
America and the world. The chief opportunity for cooperation is the ability of 
specific industry sectors to work on mutual solutions for the benefit of member 
countries. This is encouraged through direct provisions of the Agreement. For 
example, Chapter 28 on Good Regulatory Practices encourages open dialogue on 
rule-making and regulatory compatibility and cooperation.66 It also encourages the 
development of research co-ops, private industry group cooperation, and 
collaboration within international fora.67 Similarly, Chapter 30 allows ministers of 
the governments to collaborate and consider “all matters relating to the 
implementation or operation of this Agreement,”68 establish standing committees 
and working groups,69 and “seek the advice of non-governmental persons or 
groups.”70 
III. WHAT DOES THE COMPLETION OF THE USMCA SUGGEST FOR OTHER 
TRADE ISSUES? 
A. Reform of Canada’s dairy management system 
With the increase in access to the Canadian dairy market afforded in the 
USMCA and other recent trade agreements such as the Comprehensive and 
 
 62 Government of Canada, U.S. Section 232 side letters summary (Oct. 25, 2018), available 
at http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/
usmca-aeumc/article-232.aspx?lang=eng. 
 63 Id. at 1. 
 64 Alan Beattie & James Politi, How is Donald Trump’s USMCA trade deal different from 
NAFTA?, FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/92e9ce0a-c55f-11e8-
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Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”) and EU-Canada 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”), Canada’s dairy 
producers are expecting to lose up to 10% market share.71 Critics of Canada’s 
system have stated that now is the time to restructure or completely abandon the 
system.72 Given the dismantling of price supports in the U.S. dairy industry in 
2014,73 the area may be ripe for cooperation between the two governments and 
relevant industry groups, although that would require a large leap of faith and is 
inconsistent with the media reports of the Canadian dairy industry response to the 
very limited opening of the Canadian market. 
B. Global Excess Capacity in Steel and Aluminum 
The world is presently suffering from a seismic overcapacity of steel 
production and issues of unsustainable pricing, largely as a result of Chinese 
subsidies, state planning, and the role of state-owned and -invested enterprises in 
these and other sectors.74 While the G20 and Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (“OECD”) have been studying the problems and 
calling for solutions,75 and while China has taken certain steps to reduce some of 
its excess capacity, the problem overhangs global markets and likely will for years 
to come. 76 
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mile’, FINANCIAL POST, (Sept. 12, 2018), https://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/
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 72 See Editorial, Globe editorial: End supply management in Canada, but do it fairly, THE 
GLOBE AND MAIL (Mar. 11, 2018), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/editorials/article-
globe-editorial-end-supply-management-in-canada-but-do-it-fairly/; Jesse Snyder, ‘Cheese 
ninjas’ to the rescue: Why Canada’s supply management system needs reform, FINANCIAL POST 
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THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-
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https://www.agweb.com/article/dairy_policy_changes_in_the_2014_farm_bill_naa_university
_news_release/ (discussing how the “Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP), the Dairy 
Export Incentive Program (DEIP), and the Federal Milk Marketing Order Review Commission 
are repealed in the Agricultural Act of 2014”). 
 74 See BUREAU OF INDUS. & SEC., OFFICE OF TECH. EVALUATION, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY: AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED 
UNDER SECTION 232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962, AS AMENDED 14-16 (2018) 
[hereinafter Steel Section 232 Report]. 
 75 See Ministerial Report, G20 Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity, Ministerial Meeting 
(Sept. 20, 2018), available at https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/
gfsec_ministerial_report_2018.pdf; OECD, Getting stronger, but tensions are rising, OECD 
Interim Economic Outlook (Mar. 13, 2018), https:/www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/Getting-stronger-
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(“Governments should avoid escalation and rely on global solutions to resolve excess capacity 
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 76 World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2018, 9, 14-15, available at 
https://www.worldsteel.org/en/dam/jcr:f9359dff-9546-4d6b-bed0-996201185b12/World 
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Many countries in the world have taken individual actions to address problems 
flowing from the massive excess capacity. Most have used trade remedies 
(antidumping, countervailing duty, and/or safeguard actions). The United States 
earlier in 2018, and following lengthy investigations under Section 232 of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962,77 found that imports of steel and aluminum were a 
threat to the national security of the United States.78 The President then assessed 
duties on all imports (subject to country negotiations of other ways to address U.S. 
concerns) of 25% on steel and 10% on aluminum.79 While a number of countries 
did enter into negotiations with the U.S. to find an alternative solution to the United 
States’ planned tariffs, many countries, including Canada and Mexico, simply 
retaliated against the United States. Canada and Mexico have requested 
consultations at the WTO on the consistency of U.S. actions, and the U.S. 
separately has requested consultations on the consistency of the retaliatory 
measures of Canada and Mexico, and has asserted the right to take such actions in 
the cases filed by the two countries. 80 
With the USMCA concluded, Canada and the U.S. (and Mexico and the U.S.) 
are in discussions on how the 232 issue can be resolved. Canada and Mexico have 
expressed the hope that a resolution could be achieved before the signing of the 
Agreement at the end of November 2018, but the actual outcome currently remains 
unknown. Canada and Mexico have been pushing for simple repeal of the duties 
on them. As the U.S. Administration’s action is premised on the U.S. statute’s 
broad scope of national security (including national economic security), the 
Administration has been willing to consider quotas with other countries. Indeed, 
the Commerce Department report on the investigations identifies that if one or 
more countries are excluded or otherwise not subject to tariffs, the protection of 
national security can be achieved by quotas or by raising the duties on the 
remaining imports from other countries.81 This commitment to negotiations has 
gone beyond mere rhetoric, as evidenced by the Administration’s grant of 
exemptions to numerous countries, including Argentina, Australia, Brazil, and 
South Korea on steel, and Argentina and Australia on aluminum.82 Whether and 
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when there will be a resolution of the steel and aluminum issue with Canada and 
Mexico remains an open question. Press indicate that the November 30 signing of 
the USMCA will occur regardless of whether there has been a resolution on the 
232 issue before then. 
C. Softwood Lumber 
The longstanding issue of fair trade in softwood lumber remains an issue of 
concern to both parties. Canada is a major exporter of softwood lumber to the 
United States. When trade cases are filed by industry in the United States seeking 
the imposition of countervailing and antidumping duties to offset the material 
injury the U.S. industry is experiencing, a protracted dispute is certain first at the 
agencies, then through dispute settlement processes (NAFTA and WTO), and then 
(often) through government-to-government negotiations for a possible agreement. 
In pushing for the preservation of a neutral forum in the USMCA comparable to 
NAFTA’s Chapter 19, Canada was largely animated by concerns over these 
proceedings. The United States, on the other hand, remains concerned that the 
Canadian government (basically its provincial governments) continues to 
subsidize and/or dump lumber in the United States, to the detriment of the U.S. 
domestic industry. This dispute periodically resurfaces and goes back to 1982.83 
Numerous agreements between the parties have proven unsuccessful at 
permanently resolving it. The intractability of this dispute is, from the U.S. 
perspective, largely the result of provincial control over timber in Canada. The 
unique delegation of authority to the provinces alone to legislate over property 
under the Canadian Constitution makes federal promises regarding this industry 
largely ineffective without provincial government support.84 For any lasting 
resolution, the Canadian government will need to find a way to enforce uniform 
guarantees to the United States. Nothing about the USMCA will facilitate a final 
resolution to this longstanding bilateral trade issue. 
D. WTO Reform 
The Trump Administration is the third U.S. Administration to raise concerns 
with the WTO dispute settlement system.85 While the U.S., like most other 
countries, has generally been supportive of most decisions reached (whether for or 
against the U.S. as such), the U.S. has repeatedly identified situations where the 
panels or Appellate Body were exceeding their authority.86 The substantive and 
procedural concerns of the United States were succinctly outlined in the 
 
 83 See Helmut Mach, The Softwood Lumber Dispute, 27 Can.-U.S. L.J. 287 (2001). 
 84 See CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. 
II, no. 5, arts. 91-92 (Can.). 
 85 See Terence P. Stewart, The Future of the WTO - Will Reform Happen in a Timely 
Manner?, TRADE FLOW (Nov. 8, 2018); http://www.stewartlaw.com/article/ViewArticle/1138. 
 86 See Press Release, Statement of the United States by Ambassador Michael Punke at the 
13th WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States of America at 5 (Dec. 19, 2016), 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speechestranscripts/2016/december/
Statement-US-13-WTO-TPR-USA. 
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President’s 2018 Trade Policy Agenda.87 First, in the United States’ perspective, 
WTO adjudicators have gone beyond the scope of their mandate in that they have 
“added to or diminished” the rights and obligation of WTO members, in 
contravention of express provisions in the Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(“DSU”).88 Second, the United States believes the adjudicative system has 
exceeded its authorities by assessing and ruling on various matters that have not 
been necessary to resolving the specific disputes before it.89 In the United States’ 
view, this approach goes beyond the envisioned role of the system as one of 
contract arbitration.90 The U.S. has also been concerned about the issuance of 
advisory opinions contrary to the limited roles of the Appellate Body and panel, 
set out in the WTO’s DSU. Similarly, the U.S. has expressed extensive concerns 
over the failure of the Appellate Body to limit its review to issues of law and its 
insistence on reviewing issues of fact despite its lack of authority to do so. Third, 
the United States has significant concerns regarding the Appellate Body’s (1) 
failure to comply with the ninety-day decision deadline,91 and (2) the Appellate 
Body’s practice of permitting individuals whose term as an Appellate Body 
member has expired to continue to work on appeals that they were assigned to 
prior to the termination of their service (Rule 15 of the Appellate Body’s Working 
Procedures).92 
While a review of the DSU that has been ongoing for more than twenty-two 
years at the WTO continues, modifications to the system have not been adopted.93 
Instead, the Appellate Body’s decision-making has become increasingly 
backlogged and strayed from helping the parties resolve disputes between them to 
creating rights and obligations not originally a part of the system. Moreover, the 
Appellate Body has insisted that their decisions must be followed despite the DSU 
not being a system intended to establish precedent. 
Under the Trump Administration, the United States has used the requirement 
for consensus decision-making in the WTO to block new Appellate Body 
appointments or reappointments until the United States’ concerns have been 
addressed. With the Appellate Body being down to three members, the WTO is 
thirteen months away from having fewer members than the minimum needed to 
hear an appeal. Other members of the WTO, including Canada, have been looking 
at WTO reform to both address U.S. concerns with the dispute settlement system 
and to update the WTO to cover issues of importance to global commerce in 2018, 
such as transparency and notification, among other issues. 94 
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It is hoped that the completion of the USMCA will permit the U.S. and Canada 
to help reform the WTO, as many of the issues identified by Canada as of possible 
interest to likeminded countries are also of interest to the United States.95 In 
December 2017, at the WTO Ministerial in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Lighthizer, 
despite recognizing serious challenges, expressed that “the WTO is obviously an 
important institution. It does an enormous amount of good, and provides a helpful 
negotiating forum for Contracting Parties.”96 Outside of dispute settlement, the 
United States is pursuing reform in various ways. For example, in 2017, the U.S. 
submitted a new proposal on enhancing transparency and strengthening 
notification requirements in the WTO.97 A similar proposal was recently submitted 
by Argentina, Costa Rica, the European Union, Japan, and the U.S. on November 
1, 2018.98 Similarly, the U.S., EU, and Japan issued a joint declaration in Buenos 
Aires on the need to address subsidies, state-owned enterprises, and state planning 
that distort global markets and create massive global excess capacity.99 These 
subjects have been addressed both in Canada’s recent discussion paper and in a 
similar paper from the EU.100 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is obviously significant to all businesses in North America to have an 
updated free trade agreement providing updated rules, expanded market access and 
predictability going forward. The U.S. Administration has attempted to address 
issues of historic importance to labor and environmental groups in an effort to 
build a broader coalition of support for any needed implementation legislation. 
Whether the Administration will be successful in gaining Congressional approval 
will be an important topic in 2019. For this Administration, obtaining more 
reciprocal trade among our neighbors is the same objective they have with other 
trading partners. The periodic opportunity to review and update the Agreement is 
an important improvement that should permit the parties to keep the USMCA 
relevant to changing market realities. 
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Important trading partners like Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. have many 
opportunities to collaborate and find mutually beneficial solutions. Starting from 
a solid trilateral agreement makes it more likely that the North American neighbors 
will use the opportunities that present themselves. WTO reform should be one such 
area. Canada’s actions in convening a group of “likeminded” countries in Ottawa 
in October 2018 is a good first step that will, over time, need to include the United 
States. 
There are also issues where national priorities, constitutional concerns, or 
cultural differences prevent or make more difficult the finding of acceptable 
solutions. Softwood lumber is one of those issues (constitutional authority in the 
provinces restricts the ability of the Canadian government to find an enduring 
solution with the United States), and addressing perceived issues of national 
economic security is another (for example, the current Administration’s use of 
section 232). The USMCA has eased concerns and provided greater certainty for 
Canada, Mexico, and producers with operations in those countries regarding the 
ongoing 232 auto investigation. Time will tell what the resolution on steel and 
aluminum 232 orders will be. 
